

Declaration of Clay U. Parikh

I, CLAY U. PARIKH, declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct:

1. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth below and would testify competently to them if called upon to do so.

2. I have a Master of Science in Cyber Security, Computer Science from the University of Alabama in Huntsville. I have a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science, Systems Major from the University of North Carolina at Wilmington. In February 2007 I obtained the Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) certification and have continually maintained good standing. I also hold the following certifications: Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) and Certified Hacking Forensic Investigator (CHFI).

3. Since December 2003 I have continually worked in the areas of Information Assurance (IA), Information Security and Cyber Security. I have performed countless Root Cause Analyses (RCA) to determine the root causes of equipment malfunctions, system, and network issues. I also have a IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL)v3 certification, focused on a global framework of best practices for systematic risk management, customer relations, and delivery of stable, scalable, adaptable organizational IT environments.¹

4. From 2008 to 2017, I worked through a professional staffing company for several testing laboratories that tested electronic voting machines. These laboratories included Wyle Laboratories, which was later acquired by National Technical Systems (NTS), and

¹ <https://www.cio.com/article/272361/infrastructure-it-infrastructure-library-til-definition-and-solutions.html>

Pro V&V. My duties were to perform security tests on vendor voting systems for certification of those systems by either the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), to Federal Voting System Standards (VSS) or Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), or to a specific state's Secretary of State's requirements.

5. I have read the “Maricopa County 2022 General Election Ballot-on-Demand Printer Investigation”² report (hereafter, “Maricopa BOD Report”). I have read the transcript of *Lake v. Hobbs, CV 2022-095403 Evidentiary Hearing*. I have also read multiple emails received as responsive documents to Public Records Request (PRR) that were submitted to Maricopa County. I also have read several reports of analysis of log data from Maricopa County voting systems used in the 2022 General Election, received responsive to PRR, and have personally reviewed the data used to create the reports. I make the following observations.

Executive Summary

6. In response to a Public Records Request, Maricopa County returned the system log files for 445 voting center tabulators used in the November 8th, 2022, election on or about December 6th, 2022. A thorough, months-long analysis of the tabulator system logs was conducted as part of our investigation. The meticulous data model design and intelligence isolation exercises included over thirty million lines (~30,192,847) of system log entries. The scope of this effort encompassed several thousand-man hours in research, data

² By Ruth V. McGregor April 10, 2023.

analysis, interviews, testing and collaboration. Further complicating this time-consuming process were incomplete records which hampered the efficiency of our review.

7. To gain an accurate understanding of events relevant to the November 2022 general election in Maricopa County, multiple subsequent Public Records Requests (PRR) were made as well as receiving documents produced by Maricopa County in response to requests such as the Arizona State Senate subpoena issued by Senator Townsend. Lastly, specific information and data points sourced from the Ballot On Demand (BOD) printer investigation report (hereinafter “Maricopa-BOD Report”) by Chief Justice McGregor contributed materially to the findings detailed herein.

8. Through these efforts we have been able to definitively make the following determinations:

a. None of the 446 voting center tabulators used on Election Day in Maricopa County were tested for Logic & Accuracy on October 11th, 2022 in violation of Arizona law.

b. The only testing of the 446 voting center tabulators with the same election project as that used on Election Day, occurred on October 14, 17th or 18th, *after* Maricopa County and the Secretary of State both certified the machines.

c. Subjected to a test averaging 9 ballots, 260 of the 446 voting center tabulators failed the clandestine post-certification test with the same “Ballot Misread” and paperless “Paper-Jam” errors that plagued voters on Election Day.

d. Following the tests of October 14, 17, and 18, and with the failed state of the tabulators preserved, Maricopa County knowingly and intentionally, or with

reckless disregard, distributed the tabulators to voting centers for use on Election Day.

e. The “print to fit” issue was not caused by the reasons given, not limited to Oki BOD printers, nor was the condition isolated to only three voting centers.

f. The “print to fit” resized ballot images were found by the Maricopa BOD report to be being produced intermittently.

g. Voting center tabulator system logs reveal that over 8,000 ballots were rejected for errors unique to the print-to-fit condition, which could not be read by either voting center or central count tabulators and required duplication.

h. The speckled/faded print issue was also not caused by the reasons given by Maricopa County.

i. The combination of both printer errors yielded approximately 7,000 ballot rejections every 30 minutes. A rate which persisted and went unmitigated from the time the polls opened until they were closed.

Maricopa’s L&A Testing Did Not Comply With Arizona Law

9. The EPM specifically states, “The Board of Supervisors or officer in charge of elections is responsible for performing an L&A test on all voting equipment prior to each election. The conduct of the test must be overseen by at least two elections staff or inspectors (of different political parties) and shall be open to observation by representatives of the political parties, candidates, the press, and the public.

None of the 446 Voting Center Tabulators Were Tested for Logic & Accuracy

11. System logs and L&A records provided by Maricopa County establish that no vote center tabulators (Dominion ICP-2) used on Election Day were tested for Logic & Accuracy on October 11, 2022. A failure to test all equipment to be used for the election is a failure to comply with ARS and the EPM.

12. Maricopa County and the Arizona Secretary of State both falsely certified that L&A testing was conducted in a public test on October 11, 2022 (See **Exhibit 1**), when no vote center tabulators had been tested.

13. A review and analysis of the data acquired via multiple PRRs show undeniable evidence that L&A testing was not properly performed, violating A.R.S. § 16-449 and EPM.

All Voting Center Tabulators Were Tested After Having Been Certified

14. The only testing of the 445 voting center tabulators with the same election project as that used on Election Day (as required by the EPM) occurred on October 14, 17th, or 18th, after Maricopa County and the Secretary of State had already signed L&A testing certifications, which must now be considered fraudulent.

15. The Maricopa BOD Report does not identify any evidence that pre-election L&A testing was performed in accordance with Arizona statute, nor was any reference made to the process or L&A testing results. This is a noticeable omission, as the report repeatedly refers to “stress testing,” despite the absence of any “stress testing” definition or

requirements in either Arizona Revised Statute (ARS) or the State of Arizona’s Elections Procedures Manual (EPM). Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-449 requires the county board of supervisors or election officers, or for state/federal candidate elections, the Secretary of State, to “have the automatic tabulating equipment and programs tested,” and further states “Electronic ballot tabulating systems “shall have the automatic tabulating equipment and programs tested to ascertain that the equipment and programs will correctly count the votes cast for all offices and on all measures.”³

16. Arizona law requires both central (ICC) and vote center tabulators (ICP2) to be L&A tested. Mr. Jarrett testified during the Lake v. Hobbs court case when asked about L&A testing that "For the County's logic and accuracy test, that is to run test ballots through; and for the County's tests, it's thousands of test ballots through our tabulation equipment, both the central count tabulation equipment as well as the tabulation equipment that would be used at the vote centers, to make sure that they are accurately programmed to tabulate those ballots."⁴


17. The 2019 EPM states that for an L&A test, the officer in charge of elections must “utilize the actual election program for Election Day (not a copy).” One record that exists which documents all tabulator activity for the election project, including all testing through the close of polls on Election Day, is called the tabulator system log, a computer log file which is created and resides on the tabulator memory cards, and which is one of the log

³ ARS 16-449.

<https://www.azleg.gov/viewdocument/?docName=https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00449.htm>


⁴ Day 1 pg. 51, Lines 5-12

files which must be preserved as an election record. A screenshot of an excerpt of the tabulator system log for tabulator 11770-A, an ICC, is shown below:



```
11770_A_SLOG.TXT X
E: > MARICOPA_MASTER_DATA > 44 VC in Central Count ICC > 44 VC in Central Count ICC > 11770_A_SLOG.TXT
1 01 Jan 1970 00:00:10 [Main thread] INFO : [Init] Logging service initialized, starting ImageCastPrecinct v 5.5.1.8
2 01 Jan 1970 00:00:10 [Main thread] INFO : [Init] CentralManager activated
3 01 Jan 1970 00:00:10 [Main thread] INFO : [Thermal Printer] Turn off printer power
4 01 Jan 1970 00:00:10 [Main thread] INFO : Machine serial number: VAL21528073
5 01 Jan 1970 00:00:10 [Main thread] INFO : [Power Controller] Power Controller FW Version: 0.0.27
6 01 Jan 1970 00:00:10 [Main thread] INFO : [Power Controller] coin battery voltage: 3160mV
7 14 Oct 2022 15:33:42 [Main thread] INFO : Lifetime counters read from eeprom: total cast 148, forwarded 134, diverted 14
8 14 Oct 2022 15:33:46 [Main thread] INFO : [Init] Adding Translator Bengali File: /media/system-card-data/data/Translations/Bengali.qm
9 14 Oct 2022 15:33:46 [Main thread] INFO : [Init] Adding Translator Chinese File: /media/system-card-data/data/Translations/Chinese.qm
```

18. The system log for the tabulator identified as “11770 A” begins on October 14th, 2022, as indicated on line 7.⁵ The same system log shows on line 69815 that the polls were closed on Election Day at 8:11 pm, thereby confirming that this log is in-fact the “actual election program for Election Day (not a copy)”. It is important to note that the log encompasses all activity for the election project beginning with the October 14th testing through the close of polls on Election Day. The tabulator log does not indicate that the tabulator was operated prior to October 14, 2022, precluding the possibility that the tabulator was tested for L&A on October 11th. The same also removes any possibility of any testing conducted on or prior to October 11 using the “actual election program.”.




```
11770_A_SLOG.TXT X
E: > MARICOPA_MASTER_DATA > 44 VC in Central Count ICC > 44 VC in Central Count ICC > 11770_A_SLOG.TXT
69812 08 Nov 2022 20:11:40 [Main thread] INFO : [UserInterface] Display the following page MenuView
69813 08 Nov 2022 20:11:40 [CentralManager] INFO : [CentralManager] Admin menu entered (UI confirmation)
69814 08 Nov 2022 20:11:41 [Main thread] INFO : [Menu] The main menu selected : Poll Management
69815 08 Nov 2022 20:11:42 [Main thread] INFO : [Menu] The action menu selected: Close Poll...
69816 08 Nov 2022 20:11:42 [Main thread] INFO : [WizardCommand] Command execution requested for the command with the id {5FA2E086-C136-4976-8E27-12F
69817 08 Nov 2022 20:11:42 [Main thread] INFO : [WizardCommand] Authentication required for the command with the id {5FA2E086-C136-4976-8E27-12F
```

⁵ The preceding six lines in the shown log file excerpt indicate a date/time of 01 Jan 1970 00:00:10, which is an artifact of the startup of the tabulator, and reflects a default date/time prior to the tabulator updating its internal date time to reflect the data/time settings on the connected computer.

19. All Vote Center tabulator logs have the first initialization date using the same election project as that used on Election Day of October 14th, 17th, or 18th. This is at least three days *after* the county and state certified the L&A tests.

260 of the 446 Voting Center Tabulators Failed Unlawful Post-Certification Testing

20. Every one of the 446 tabulators used on Election Day were subject to some type of test on either October 14th, 17th or 18th which included an average of only 9 ballots which 260 of the 446 tabulators failed with the same errors as those experienced-on Election Day.



21. The test described above was not open to the public, no public notice was issued, and no political party observers were present as required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-449 and the EPM.

22. There is no record of memory card seals for any of the voting center tabulators on any of the L&A Checklists in violation of Arizona Law.

The Tabulators Were Distributed For Use on Election Day in Their Failed State

23. The vote center tabulator system logs show no subsequent attempts to rescan, troubleshoot or remedy the clear and obvious failures which the testing unveiled.

24. Considering the overwhelming failure of the vote center tabulators during the post-certification testing defined above, along with the absence of any actions to identify or rectify the cause of the failure, there remains no logical expectation other than that which was experienced on Election Day- continued failure.

25. Maricopa County failed to provide the results aggregated by the Election Management System (EMS) server for the testing of the vote center tabulators, despite Maricopa County's fact-check page claiming that the purpose of L&A was to confirm the accuracy of those EMS-aggregated vote tabulation results:

The purpose of an L&A test is to "confirm that votes are attributed to the correct candidates and ballot measures in the election management system (EMS) and that each candidate and ballot measure receives the accurate number of votes" (Elections Procedures Manual pg. 86). Predetermined results are compared against the results of the L&A test. The equipment cannot be used in the election unless the results of the test are accurate.

The Central Count Tabulators Could Not Overcome Printing Failures

26. The first issue to point out from the footnote is the statement that "the central tabulators read all ballots;" this is not necessarily true. The central tabulators do and did reject defective ballots. This will be proven later. But first, it is important to understand

how the contest selections on a paper ballot are counted. Tabulators do not count or “read” directly from the paper document, but instead produce an electronic image of the ballot. The Dominion Voting System (hereafter, “Dominion”) software on both the ImageCast Central (ICC) (used for central scanning) and the ImageCast Precinct-2 (ICP2) scanner/tabulators (used at vote centers) create the same resolution image. The image is resampled on the ICC/ICP2 into either black and white (B&W) or grayscale, at a purported resolution of 150-200 dots per inch (dpi), depending upon the jurisdiction’s preferences. Only after this process is the ballot image passed to the Dominion software to analyze, authenticate, and then count the contest selections, through a software-controlled process which digitally compares that electronic ballot image with a predetermined “map” of vote choice locations to identify vote marks within those predetermined ballot vote choice areas, each of which correspond to a unique machine identifier (ID) within the election project software database, so that detected marks (votes) are tabulated in the database and correlated with vote choices per ballot race, issue, or measure. The capabilities of the scanner hardware itself have very minimal effect on the resulting ballot image that is tabulated by the Dominion software. The ICC and ICP2 function and process a ballot image in substantially, functionally identical manner, as confirmed by a former Dominion employee familiar with the two tabulation systems.

The “Print to Fit” Issue Was Not Isolated to the Oki BOD Printers

27. The proper functioning of BOD printers during an election is vital to Maricopa’s Vote Center model, and pre-election testing of both E-Pollbooks and BOD printers is

required by the EPM.⁶ Therefore, thorough pre-election testing of all BOD printers must be conducted to ensure maximum efficiency and accuracy of all components. Maricopa has approximately 760 BOD printers. Approximately 600 of those are the OKI model B432 and 160 are the Lexmark model C4150. The OKI model makes up about 78% of the printer inventory and is the most widely used printer during Election Day.

Small Testing Samples Were Inadequate Yet Showed Unmitigated Problems

28. The report then states without citation: “but the actual ballot page was clear and not damaged as to the ballot’s overall integrity. The central count tabulator successfully counted all ballots, as did an on-site tabulator.”⁷ The report’s pre-General Election testing mentions an on-site tabulator, however, the pre-Primary testing does not mention testing the on-site tabulators. From the pre-Primary section “The central count tabulator successfully counted all the ballots. ... And, during the primary election, the on-site tabulators did successfully process more than 100,000 ballots.”¹² Footnote twelve reveals several issues. One is that the on-site tabulators were not tested. “*A suggestion of a problem did occur during early voting in the primary. Ballots from early voting are returned to the MCTEC in envelopes, removed by bi-partisan teams of workers, and tabulated on central equipment. Some of the workers noted flaking or speckling on some ballots and brought it*

⁶ pp. 109

⁷ pp. 8

to the attention of supervisors. Because the central tabulators read all ballots, however, the issue was not regarded as affecting the ability to count all ballots and no testing was done using on-site tabulators. Whether such testing would have detected the problem experienced on general election day cannot now be determined. Interview with MCED personnel.”⁸


29. Maricopa County officials referred to central count tabulators (ICC) being able to properly scan defective BOD ballots which the ICP2 scanners were unable to properly scan and attribute this ability to the ICC being more powerful compared to the ICP2. The table below shows the total number of error counts from ICCs at MCTEC during the general election.

TabType	ErrorType	ErrorCnt
ED	Back Page Grid Error	204
ED	Unrecognizable Ballot Id-Top Side Error	111
ED	Ballot Id Not In Database	84
ED	Front Page Grid Error	67
ED	Unrecognizable Ballot Id-BottomSide Error	59
ED	Unrecognizable Ballot Id-Stopped Scanning as Misread	24
ED	Unrecognizable Ballot Id-Image Error	9
EV	Back Page Grid Error	1096
EV	Front Page Grid Error	838
EV	Unrecognizable Ballot Id-BottomSide Error	236
EV	Unrecognizable Ballot Id-Top Side Error	154
EV	Unrecognizable Ballot Id-Image Error	134
EV	Unrecognizable Ballot Id-Stopped Scanning as Misread	108
EV	Unknown	1
EV	Unrecognizable Ballot Id-Other	1
PR	Unrecognizable Ballot Id-Stopped Scanning as Misread	14
PR	Back Page Grid Error	9
PR	Front Page Grid Error	5

⁸ Report pg. 7, footnote 12. [Italicized for emphasis]

PR	Unrecognizable Ballot Id-Top Side Error	1
		3155

30. The EPM states in section 4 “Errors Discovered During Testing” that an “errorless count shall be made” before systems are approved for use in elections. It also states that all errors or failures must be reported to the Secretary of State. The tests that were conducted on October 14, 17th, or 18th have massive failures even though the test included only an average of nine ballots. Over half of the voting center tabulators failed the misfeed requirement. The resulting details are listed in **Exhibit 3**.



31. There were other issues with the L&A tests. Maricopa County provided tabulator poll tapes and checklists purportedly for L&A testing for the 2022 General Election (see Exhibit 4). A poll tape is like a cash register’s paper receipt, but for a tabulator; it records

the identity and time-tagged status and activity of the tabulator. One poll tape is printed before the polls open, called a “zero tape,” which shows that each specifically identified machine has counted zero ballots, and is configured with a specific software version. A second poll tape one, called a poll “closing tape,” is printed after the polls close (normally on election night - except for those printed during L&A testing) and shows the number of votes tabulated for each candidate or selection for every contest, issue and measure, from all ballots scanned and tabulated on that specific tabulator. **Exhibit 4** highlights several issues. First, the total number of ballots tested is only 23. As defined earlier, each tabulator is required to be tested with a minimum of 59 ballots for L&A. Second, by cutting the tapes short, the serial number, date/timestamp, software version, poll worker certification, and protective counter numbers are all missing; without these data elements, the veracity of the poll tape cannot and should not be assumed – it’s like a driver’s license with no name or issue date. There is nothing shown on the tapes which can associate a given poll tape to a specific tabulator. Nearly all the tapes produced by Maricopa County in response to the PRR are similarly incomplete.

32. The tapes provided in response to a PRR for L&A testing records showed a test which was purportedly conducted from October 5th-8th which was not L&A testing. The only date associated with the tapes was on the accompanying checklists as the poll tapes were all cut short as shown in Exhibit 4. Strangely, another set of incomplete tapes was also provided for inspection in response to the same PRR and nearly all had the same seal serial numbers as those from the first “test”. The corresponding poll tapes each showed only 5 or 8 ballots cast. Poll tapes don’t reflect the number of misreads nor the number of ballots

rejected, but the tabulator system logs revealed errors consistent with those generated on Election Day due to both BOD printer problems

19” Fit to print issue was an intentional malicious act

33. During the Lake v. Hobbs case evidentiary hearing testimony,⁹ when questioned about issues on election day with ballot on-demand printers, Scott Jarrett testified “A few of the other items that we’ve identified, though, as far as our ballot on-demand printers, we did identify three different locations that had a fit-to-paper setting that was adjusted on Election Day. So those were at our Journey Church in a north Glendale/Peoria area, that had about 200 or a little over 200 ballots had that setting on it out of about 1,500 ballots voted at that voting location. That would be the same with our Gateway Fellowship church, which is an east Mesa voting location. That had about 900 ballots out of just shy of 2,000 ballots voted at the voting location. And then we had LDS church, Lakeshore, in the heart of Tempe, that had about 60 ballots out of 1,500.”¹⁰ Jarrett describes the 19” image on 20” paper as “fit-to-paper” issue. Jarrett stated that the issue “was due to our temporary technicians, when they were trying to identify solutions on Election Day, adjusting a setting.”¹¹ So Jarrett’s testimony implies that this fit-to-paper issue was limited in scope and was caused by T-techs¹² troubleshooting the speckled ballot issue. This assessment has several inconsistencies.

⁹ CV2022-095403

¹⁰ Pg. 180, Lines 1-14

¹¹ Pg. 180, Lines 15-18

¹² “T-techs” are “temporary technical workers,” as described by Maricopa County officials and described in the McGregor Report, hired by Maricopa County to, among other responsibilities,

34. However, the investigative report states this is a random occurrence. “During our testing, four printers randomly printed one or a few “fit to page” ballots in the middle of printing a batch of ballots.”¹³ Prior to this revelation it was stated that “We could not determine whether this change resulted from a technician attempting to correct the printing issues, the most probable source of change, or a problem internal to the printers.” There is no mention of how they tried to determine cause of the “fit to page” issue. The report only mentions when the issue occurred during their testing that “None of the technical people with whom we spoke could explain how or why that error occurred.” The report did not identify any cause for the random printing of misconfigured ballots.
35. Jarrett testified that techs had made changes and caused the issue. There were no troubleshooting changes made during the investigative testing. There are no settings a tech or anyone could make on the printer to make randomized size changes to a printer. If this is purely a random error caused internally by the printer it is either a software bug or extremely rare hardware issue. The software bug would have the most likelihood. However, there are no bug fixes or patches listed by the vendor. A patch or bug fix would most likely exist as this would affect every Oki printer of this type. This randomness still does not hold water as footnote 29 in the report reveals that this “fit to page” issue occurred with both Oki and Lexmark printers.¹⁴ It is impossible to have the same randomly occurring issue on two different types, models and manufacturers of printers.

set-up and test BOD printers at vote centers, and respond to technical problems which arise during elections.

¹³ Report Pg.12, second paragraph

¹⁴ Report pg. 12

36. The only cause of this is erroneous code/malware or remote configuration changes.

During his testimony, Scott Jarrett stated that the fit-to-print issue occurred because t-techs adjusted a printer setting while troubleshooting the “speckled ballot” issue at three locations. His testimony is inconsistent with all available evidence, including the McGregor Report’s admission that some of their randomly-selected printers randomly printed 19” ballot images during testing, for unknown reasons, at unpredictable times and intervals, and the printer manufacturer’s technical data, which indicates no setting or combination of setting which would allow or could cause technician settings adjustments to cause the printing of 19” ballot images on 20” paper, much less for those settings to cause or allow the random, unpredictable printing of those 19” ballot images. The McGregor Report’s admission that the “fit-to-print” issue arose in both Oki and Lexmark printers on Election Day precludes the possibility that the issue resulted from an on-printer setting on the Oki printers, and that the issue was caused by technicians troubleshooting the issue on Oki printers. Because the two printers use different hardware and software, and because the issue occurred “randomly” and unpredictably, the most likely cause is a software control external to all the printers, for example either malware or unauthorized configuration or software on the SiteBooks. That possibility was not investigated, nor evidently apparent to or considered, by the McGregor Report team, which completely lacked the cyber expertise necessary for such an investigation.

37. Both the McGregor report and Maricopa County officials have admitted that the “fit to print” (19” image on 20” paper)-affected ballots could not be tabulated on either the ICC or ICP2, which begs the question of ballot duplication. As the expert who inspected the ballots for the plaintiff in the trial. I was allowed to inspect the original ballots which were

supposedly duplicated, so as to allow their machine tabulation, however, I was not provided any of the duplicate ballots.

38. During the trial evidentiary hearing, I was asked if duplicated ballots could be duplicated; I responded “If they are duplicated correctly and they are configured correctly, yes...” However, during my inspection of the ballots the preceding day, I asked Jarrett where the duplicated ballots were. Jarrett responded in words or substance that “I can’t produce those things right now it would take me over a week with all my techs.” Because I was never provided the duplicated ballots I requested, I had and have had no way of knowing if the original ballots were duplicated at all, let alone duplicated accurately, let alone tabulated and counted.
39. Scott Jarrett’s testimony indicating a limited scope of three vote centers and 1,300 19” ballots is false. There are far more than three vote centers that experienced 19” ballot images being printed on 20” ballot paper. All of the six sites for which I inspected ballots, had instances of 19” ballot images, and Jarrett’s three-site list only shared one site with my six-site list. Jarrett’s admission and my personal inspection confirm at least eight sites. The rates of occurrence of 19” ballot image issues and number of affected sites imply a conservative estimate of 8,000 or more Election Day ballots affected by the 19” ballot image issue.
40. For example, the Victory Church, one of the vote centers ballots I inspected, contained the originals of duplicates. I recorded two of those numbers down in my notes, in case needed at trial. They were DUP006876 and DUP006865. Via a PRR we acquired an Itemized Duplication list, identifying the batches of ballots duplicated. I was able to locate the batch my sample was drawn from. I drew 15 from a batch of 427 ballots.

BOARD4HAND0499	BOARD4HAND0516	SPECIAL CASE	18	EARLY VOTE	11/14/2022	9	
							853
DUP005005	DUP005124	ELECTION DAY SCANS	120	ELECTION DAY	11/15/2022	10	
DUP005125	DUP005267	ELECTION DAY SCANS	143	ELECTION DAY	11/15/2022	10	
DUP005268	DUP005524	ELECTION DAY SCANS	257	ELECTION DAY	11/15/2022	10	
DUP005525	DUP005910	ELECTION DAY SCANS	386	ELECTION DAY	11/15/2022	10	
DUP005911	DUP006099	ELECTION DAY SCANS	189	ELECTION DAY	11/15/2022	10	1095
DUP006101	DUP006523	ELECTION DAY SCANS	423	ELECTION DAY	11/16/2022	11	
DUP006524	DUP006675	ELECTION DAY SCANS	151	ELECTION DAY	11/16/2022	11	
DUP006676	DUP006676	ELECTION DAY SCANS	1	ELECTION DAY	11/16/2022	11	
DUP006677	DUP007106	ELECTION DAY SCANS	427	ELECTION DAY	11/16/2022	11	
DUP007107	DUP007136	ELECTION DAY SCANS	28	ELECTION DAY	11/16/2022	11	

Out of the 15 I drew, 14 were the 19” image and one was slightly torn. So the sample set was drawn at random and 93% were 19” ballot images. The sample set is just of 28% of the total batch. The probability is high that within this batch of ballots alone there are more 19” ballots. There were more door 3 ballots than the 16,724 given by Maricopa all proven by analysis of the data from the multiple PRR requests.

41. County officials announced sometime during Election Day that the remedy or temporary fix for the issue was to set all the tray settings for “media weight” to “Heavy.” This excuse does not make sense. However, the Maricopa BOD Report also mentioned that the “media type” should be changed from “plain” to “cardstock.” My team was able to duplicate the speckled errors during benchmark testing and confirmed both settings combined must be set appropriately. There were other settings we discovered such as ECO mode being on. ECO Mode allows printing to begin before the fuser reaches the set temperature. We reliably repeated the speckled ballot with ECO mode and a minimum time interval of 50 seconds. A review of Maricopa County’s printer settings for the November 2022 General Election has revealed that ECO Mode was in-fact enabled on all the Oki B432 printer


configuration records provided by Maricopa County.

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CONFIGURATION
TRAY COUNT
MP TRAY : 271
TRAY1 : 239
TRAY2 : 278
SUPPLIES LIFE
TONER (12.0K) : REMAINING 70 %
DRUM : REMAINING 94 %
NETWORK
IPV4 ADDRESS : 192.168.10.250
SUBNET MASK : 255.255.255.0
GATEWAY ADDRESS : 192.168.10.1
MAC ADDRESS : 00:25:30:81:7D:87
NETWORK VERSION : 00.55

SYSTEM ADJUST
POW SAVE TIME : 60 MIN
SLEEP TIME : 60 MIN
AUTO PW OFF TIME : 12 HOURS
ECO MODE : ON
CLRABLE WARNING : ONLINE
AUTO CONTINUE : OFF
MANUAL TIMEOUT : 60 SEC
TIMEOUT INJOB : 40 SEC
TIMEOUT LOCAL : 40 SEC
TIMEOUT NET : 90 SEC
LOW TONER : CONTINUE
JAM RECOVERY : ON
ERROR REPORT : OFF
```


42. The weights and tray selection were other areas where the settings were incorrect. In fact, the OKI user's manual contradicts the investigative report. The printer was not pushed to extreme limits. The printer was pushed past its capabilities and limits. Duplex printing the paper weight should never exceed 80 lb. (see **Exhibit 5**).

43. The printer Error Messages Should have Alerted T-Techs. During our benchmark test we were given errors when trying to configure the printers beyond their capabilities. These warnings are impossible to miss. They should have been detected during configuration and initial testing, as well as during any subsequent trouble-shooting by t-techs.



Error Rates


44. The Maricopa BOD Report discussed the differences in error rates between the Oki printers. However, Oki and Lexmark printers both experienced the “fit to page” issue. Maricopa County’s election hotline call log, video evidence and Goldenrod reports identify instances of the “fit to page” issue at 127 vote centers on Election Day. One example is Gateway Fellowship Church which only had Lexmark printers.



45.

The T-techs exchange texts (see box upper left corner of figure) and selects the “Use full printable area” and the misread errors go away.


46. Maricopa County's claim that the late afternoon fixes resolved the issues is incorrect. The graph below shows thousands of false paper jam errors lasting almost all day from 6:30



a.m. to 7 p.m.


47. Election Day showed a widespread, continuous pattern of ICP scanner ballot insert failures. There was an average of 7,000 ballot insert failures every 30 minutes from 7 a.m.

to 8 p.m.



48. The following chart represents the aggregated voting center tabulator system log data from 445 machines used to scan ballots on Election Day. Using a threshold of misfeeds of over twenty 20%, nearly three fourths, or 71% of all ballots scanned on Election Day were involuntarily rejected. A 20% rate of rejection wildly fails EAC standards which limit the scanner/tabulator machine errors to .2% or .002. The extraordinarily high threshold of 20%, 100 times higher than the EAC standard, was chosen to illustrate the breadth and

magnitude of these failures.




49. The random “fit to page” issue findings of the Maricopa BOD report contradicts Scott Jarrett’s explanation and testimony concerning the issue. The reports’ lack of a conclusion for the random occurrence demonstrates that the report was incomplete. The impossibility of two different printer manufacturers having the same internal malfunction reinforces the conclusion that the failures of the printers on Election Day was an intentional act. The issues for the 19” image are either from malware or remote administration changes. There are Arizona Election Procedure Manual violations dealing with testing procedures, documentation. L&A testing was not properly conducted. A full forensic audit should be

conducted on all the voting system components involved with this past General Election,
to include the SiteBooks, BOD printers and contractor equipment.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 8 day of May 2023.



s/ Clay U. Parikh